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Abstract: 
This paper studies to what extent the diversity of exchange rate regimes within Mercosur 
exerts an influence on the feasibility of a monetary union in this area. A semi-structural VAR 
model is built for each country, including a set of international and domestic variables. Based 
on impulse response functions and forecast error decomposition, we conclude that differences 
of exchange rate regime explain significantly the divergences of economic dynamics triggered 
by foreign or domestic shocks. Second, we decompose the structural innovations generated by 
each country model into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components, using a state-
space model. This last exercise, intended to assess the degree of policy coordination between 
the Mercosur members, did not disclose any common component for the structural 
innovations generated by the three national models. 
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1. Introduction 
The Common market of the South (Mercosur) was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion signed 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. At the beginning the formal project was just a free 
trade agreement. During the 90s, the signatory countries envisaged a more ambitious economic and 
monetary process of integration. The Mexican (1994), Asian (1997), Russian (1998), Brazilian (1999) 
and Argentina (2001-2002) crises strongly increased the volatility of the macroeconomic variables. In 
the face of shocks, economies gave priority to national concerns, weakening the economic and 
institutional links embodied in the Asuncion Treaty. 
This evolution raises the question of the feasibility of a regional monetary union between the 
Mercosur countries3. The basic Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) literature identifies criteria to 
determine the appropriate domain –the optimal size- of a currency area. Countries can optimally form 
a monetary union when they fulfill the following criteria: (i) a high factor mobility; (ii) a high degree 
of trade; (iii) a strong symmetry of shocks explained by the diversified composition of output and 
trade; (iv) a high degree of financial integration; and (v) a high degree of similarity in preferences 
between member countries of the currency area. Eichengreen (1998), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2000), Larrain and Tavares (2003), and Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) used the OCA theory to 
determine if Central and Latin American countries can choose a monetary union as their exchange rate 
regime. Their conclusion –using cross-section or panel data (as econometric methodology)- is that 
Mercosur countries are far from achieving the pre-requisites to constitute an OCA. From this point of 
view, Latin American countries (LAC) differ from other regions such as East Asia. 
Alesina and Barro (2002) analyse currency unions in terms of costs and benefits. They distinguish two 
benefits: first, trade benefits - where the higher the bilateral trade the higher the gains linked to the 
reduction of transaction costs after adopting a common currency - and, second, the benefits of 
commitment (where the irreversibility of the currency union leads to a decrease in inflation). The main 
cost of a currency union is the loss of independent monetary policy. This cost increases with the 
importance of asymmetric disturbances across potential members of the union. Alesina, Barro, and 
Tenreyro (2003) have tested this model using annual data of bilateral trade, inflation rates, co-
movements of prices and output over the period 1960-1997. They show that the US dollar is not a 
good anchor for Mercosur countries. Co-movements of prices and outputs with the United States are 
weak. This result is particularly striking for the two main countries of this area: Argentina for which 
neither the US Dollar nor the Euro are natural anchors and Brazil for which the European currency is a 
more appropriate anchor. 
Contrary to what OCA theory and cost-benefit analysis of a monetary union propose, our approach is 
exclusively based on the business cycle properties of the Mercosur countries. Our analysis focuses on 
                                                 
3. For date availability reason, our study covers only three countries : Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. 
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business cycles synchronization across countries, on the propagation mechanisms of shocks, and on 
their common and specific components. 
Our paper raises several questions linked to the feasibility of a currency union in Mercosur. First, to 
what extent has the adoption of different exchange rate regimes affected the countries’ reactions to 
disturbances? In other words, is the diversity of exchange rate regimes inside the area an obstacle to 
macroeconomic policy coordination? Different adjustments to similar external and/or domestic shocks 
give indications onto the degree of coordination between Mercosur countries. Second, what is the 
respective share of common and specific components of disturbances in the studied countries? Weak 
common components imply large exchange rate adjustments decreasing the feasibility of a currency 
union. They result either from the existence of asymmetric shocks across countries or from the 
absence of macroeconomic policy coordination. Third, taking into account the strong sensibility of 
LAC to boom-bust cycles in international capital markets, we try to determine to what extent 
international financial disturbances influence their business cycles. 
A large body of empirical research focusing on the cyclical properties of Mercosur countries has been 
published. A first strand of literature uses different specifications to decompose cycles in specific and 
common components. Karras (2003) analyses real output fluctuations for Central and Latin American 
countries and for Canada with annual data over the period 1950-1997. The decomposition reveals that 
country-specific shocks in the Americas are both large and asynchronous. These countries are not an 
OCA. Using panel data econometrics, Loayza, Lopez, and Ubide (1999) build an error components 
model to estimate which fraction of annual real value-added growth in a given country can be 
attributed to country-specific factors - such as factor endowments or economic policies - or to 
common factors affecting all sectors and countries in a similar fashion, such as a financial crisis. The 
higher the proportion of variability in output growth rates explained by common factors –that is by 
country-independent factors- the higher the integration across countries is. For the period 1970-1994, 
the authors find that country-specific factors are dominant both in the short and long terms. A second 
strand of literature takes into account a larger macroeconomic framework with VAR or VECM 
models. Hallwood, Marsh, and Scheibe (2004) use a bivariate VAR system in first difference applied 
to Mercosur countries. With quarterly data on output and price levels spanning the period 1980-2002, 
they find no common pattern of shocks. The low correlation of shock-disturbances between Mercosur 
countries and the United States suggests that dollarization of the region is not a good solution. Using a 
dynamic panel setting with annual data over the period 1983-1999, Ahmed (2003) analyzes the 
fluctuations in the main LAC. Two results are especially important. On one hand, LAC do not have 
real common shocks with their main trade partners, including the United States. On the other hand, US 
three month real interest rate shocks explain a significant share of output fluctuations in these 
countries. A currency union with the United States would increase the monetary and financial effects 
of real shocks affecting the US economy: as a result, output fluctuations in LAC would increase. 
Fanelli and González-Rozada (2003) apply a bivariate structural VAR model in first difference –
 3
including quarterly date on a GDP and a combined prices index over the period 1980-2003- to identify 
the cycles and the coordination evidences within Mercosur. They deemed “symmetry” of shocks and 
try to shed some light on their sources. The authors try also to identify the common and specific 
components of domestic cycles, a question in focus in our paper. The results show that co-movements 
of shocks are weak; a similar trend is observed for the common component of disturbances.  
Our paper differs from the previous literature on several points. First, our analysis focuses on the 
period following the creation of Mercosur. Indeed, not only the quality of data for long periods is low 
in emerging countries, but during the 80s the three economies were very instable, mainly due to the 
debt crisis and the bouts of hyperinflation: such disturbances make data processing very complex and 
unstable. So, our study begins in 1991 by taking into account more stabilized economies. Our 
approach of currency unions being based on business cycle dynamics, we use quarterly data which are 
only available and comparable since 1990 for the three countries. As a result, the paper uses quarterly 
frequency for the period 1991-Q1-2006-Q1. Second, we build a semi-structural VAR including more 
macroeconomic variables than previous studies. In comparison of works which decompose shocks 
only into their specific and common components, we are able to identify the nature of disturbances 
hitting these countries. At the opposite of bivariate VAR models, we take into account more diverse 
shocks such as external and domestic disturbances, but also policy shocks. The convergence of the 
policy-mix is one of the main pillars of an optimal monetary union, especially in its endogenous 
dimension. Third, the semi-structural VAR includes the EMBI spreads4 as an international financial. 
There is an abundant literature stressing, on one hand, the influence of external factors on capital 
inflows into emerging markets (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993); Fernández-Arias (1995); 
Bruner, and Rigobon (2004)), and, on the other hand, the destabilizing influence of these inflows on 
macroeconomic fluctuations in these countries (Calvo (2005)). In addition, several empirical studies 
dedicated to the effects of shocks originated from the United States show that financial transmission –
via monetary policy shocks- exerts a stronger influence than real transmission on LAC output 
variability5. 
Few papers dedicated to the OCA take into account the EMBI in their analysis. Fanelli and González-
Rozada (2003) show that spreads exert a significant and negative influence on the common component 
of cycles in Mercosur countries. Berg, Borensztein, and Mauro (2002) question if LAC are frequently 
hit by large and common financial shocks. A positive answer could imply that monetary and exchange 
rate policies should react in a similar way in each country. As a result, a monetary union might be 
                                                 
4. EMBI measures yield spreads (over ‘safe’ or ‘risk free’ assets which bear minimal credit risk) on emerging 
market countries’ debt instruments. The spread is the extra return required to compensate the investor for the 
additional risks faced when investing in emerging economies rather than in a ‘safe asset’ (such as a US 
government bond). EMBI measures the sovereign risk. Spreads increase with the deterioration –effective or 
expected- of fundamentals in the countries issuing bonds; they also increase in periods of international financial 
strains. 
5. See Carrera, Féliz, Panigo, and Saavedra (2002) for Argentina over the period 1991-1999 and Canova (2005) 
for a sample of central and Latin American countries over the period 1990-2002. 
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appropriate. The authors use a correlation matrix to identify the common components of all domestic 
spreads6. Their main result is that the degree of co-movements of financial variables is not higher 
among LAC than it is among other emerging markets. Uribe and Ye (2006) build a VAR system based 
on panel data set with seven emerging countries covering the period 1994-2001 at a quarterly 
frequency to analyze the respective influence of US interest rates and EMBI shocks on the 
macroeconomic fluctuations. An important finding is that EMBI shocks exacerbate the US interest rate 
shocks, implying a strong macroeconomic volatility in the studied emerging countries. 
Last but not least, we propose to break down structural innovations of domestic semi-structural VAR 
into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components using a state-space model (Harvey, 1990). 
These models respond to the drawbacks of the previous literature of which the quasi-totality  
concentrates on the correlation of shocks without disaggregating the shocks in specific common and 
components constituent in every country. These results are used to check evidence of economic 
synchronicity, and convergence of macroeconomic policy 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the outcomes of the 
estimates of a semi-structural VAR model for each economy; it identifies the interdependence between 
domestic macroeconomic variables and to external ones, and the sources of disturbances. Section three 
uses a state-space model to estimate to what extent the shocks –and especially macroeconomic policy 
shocks- have a common component allowing for speculation about coordination between Mercosur 
countries. Section four concludes. 
2. A semi-structural VAR model for the “Mercosur” 
Literature on regional integration and OCAs stresses the identification of common shocks, the degree 
of similarity in the adjustment process of the candidates and the convergence of policy responses to 
shocks. This section aims at deepening these points.  
In the context of strong links of macroeconomic variables with complex feedback linkages, the Vector 
autoregression (VAR) approach constitutes a useful tool, allowing to capture the evolution and the 
interdependences between multiple time series. All the variables are treated symmetrically, including 
for each variable an equation which explains its evolution based on its own lags and the lags of all the 
other variables in the model. Sims (1980) advocates the use of unrestricted VAR models as a theory-
free method to estimate economic relationships: contrary to the structural method based on the choice 
of a particular model, this procedure embodies alternative theories “nested” in the empirical model7. 
                                                 
6. They first regress each individual country’s spread series in the overall EMBI+ spread series, and save the 
residuals. Second they report the correlation matrix among these country-specific components of the spread 
series. 
7 As indicated in Canova (1995), the analyst’s prior knowledge is used only to decide what variables should enter 
the reduced form and, in some cases, the time series transformations to be used (log or ratios of variables).  
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The VMA (vector moving average) representation of the reduced form allows us to express the current 
and past values of the shocks, to trace out their time path on the variables contained in the VAR 
system, and to compute the impact multipliers (deduced from the impulse response functions). The 
forecast error variance decomposition indicates the proportion of the movement in a sequence due to 
its “own” shocks versus shocks to the other variables8. Thus, the convergence of evidence revealed by 
the tests, the impulse response functions, the forecast error variance decomposition and other 
forecasting properties give us some guidelines to choose between alternative theories. One of the main 
issues of these experiments comes from the identification of shocks. If the error terms of the VAR 
reduced form are correlated, there is no simple way to unambiguously identify shocks with specific 
variables, for the errors will have common components that affect more than one variable. The 
practitioner will have to attribute the effects of common components to one specific variable… biasing 
the interpretation of the impulse responses or of the forecast error variance decomposition: in short, 
the choice of procedure of identification, i.e. the procedure of shocks orthogonalization, must be based 
on some “a priori” knowledge. The Cholesky ordering is the usual and least theoretical method to 
orthogonalize shocks (this kind of “half” structural VAR is usually called either recursive VAR or 
RVAR, or, as in Doan, 2004, semi-structural VAR or SSVAR): however, the ordering is not really 
arbitrary, based on theoretical intuition. Another way is to introduce theory in these “a-theoretical” 
VAR models by the inclusion of theoretical restrictions in the “structural” VARs (SVARs).  
We choose a recursive “Semi-Structural” approach for a VAR in difference. The former choice is 
justified below; the later one – a VAR in difference - is deduced from the Johansen test results, 
pointing out the lack of empirical support in favor of any cointegrating vector between the selected 
endogenous variables9.  
Variable selection10
Our choice of variables is the traditional one for VARs analyzing external shocks, and macroeconomic 
packages in open economies (Favero (2001), Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004)). For the external 
variables, we chose (i) the Industrial Product Index of Industrialized Economies (noted I_IPI), and (ii) 
the Emerging Economy spread index of J.P. Morgan (EMBI)11, a way to account for the main real 
                                                 
8 Look at Enders (2004), for a very didactical explanation. 
9 In this case, Allen, P.G., and Fildes, R., (2004) showed that any alternative solutions - VAR in level, or VECM 
- would lead to greater forecast errors. 
10 All data are quarterly and proceed from the International Financial Statistics (IMF) except the EMBIs 
published by the Ministery of Economy and Production of the Republic of Argentina 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html) and the IPI Uruguayan published by the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Uruguay (http://www.bcu.gub.uy/). 
11 We merged two time series: the EMBI for the period 1991Q1-1997Q4 and the EMBI+ from 1998Q1. As 
indicated in Cunningham (1999), the main differences between these indices are (i) the number of financial 
instruments embodied (the EMBI tracks returns and spreads on Brady Bonds and some other restructured 
sovereign debts, the EMBI+ tracks returns on a wider range of instruments), (ii) the number of countries (11 for 
the EMBI, 16 for the EMBI+). However, in both the indices the weight of the LAC (Latin American countries) is 
very important (respectively 83.8% and 70.2%). Amongst the LAC, both Argentina and Brazil weight 47.6% of 
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supply and financial shocks. For the domestic variables (noted for each country “i”, I = A, B, U) , we 
took Industrial Product Index (i_IPI), Consumption Prices Index (i_CPI), the nominal money market 
interest rate (i_R)12 and the direct quotation of the nominal foreign exchange rate with the US $ as base 
currency (i_EN). 
We begin by checking - for each country - the stationarity of the interest rates and the EMBI, and of 
the logarithm of all the other variables. Standard Augmented Dickey Fuller tests  are largely perturbed 
by numerous shocks, periods of high inflation, stabilization programs, and change in monetary, 
currency, or fiscal regimes. But even after correction of structural breaks (Perron (1989)), all data are 
I(1), except interest rates and EMBI which are apparently I(0). As explained above, tests of 
cointegration (Johansen) failed to find any cointegrating vector13. Anyway, given the size of our data 
sample, the robustness test for stationnarity and cointegration are likely to be weak: we therefore 
followed economic theory to guide our choices.  
Amongst the available procedures to identify innovations, we did not chose an SVAR methodology. 
First, assuming a long term neutrality of nominal shocks would seem widely arbitrary for a work 
covering about twelve or so years, even if business cycles are shorter for these countries than for the 
industrialized ones14. So, contrary to numerous similar works, we don’t apply the “BQ” decomposition 
identification procedure based on long run restrictions (Blanchard and Quah (1989))15. Second, the 
inspection of the contemporary correlation matrix of the reduced form residuals (see appendix 1) 
doesn’t justify the rejection of a recursive factorization based on a lower triangular matrix in order to 
identify the short run restriction.   
In fine, the following order of Choleski factorization is deduced from our theoretical interpretation of 
the contemporary correlation matrix of the reduced form residuals of each country model. External 
variables are considered here as the most exogenous. For the domestic variables, two schemes have 
been selected, depending on the dominant exchange rate regime for the period of estimation. So, the 
order of the variables for Argentina from the most to the least exogenous will be: I_IPI, EMBI, A_EN, 
A_R, A_CPI and A_IPI. On the other hand, for Brazil and Uruguay, we choose the order I_IPI, EMBI, 
i_CPI, i_R, i_EN and i_IPI (with i=B,U). The assumption of an exogenous EMBI is shared by a 
majority of economists - in spite of the weight of Mercosur economies in this index - even if domestic 
indicators (fiscal deficit, monetary instruments, payment deficit…) can have some influence on 
                                                                                                                                                        
the EMBI+. In 1999, J.P.Morgan releases a new index, the EMBIG (for “global”) embodying more countries 
(27) and more titles. In this last index, LAC decreased to 61.5%.  
12 The domestic interest rate is the money market one: it is not exactly equivalent of the Federal Fund Rate… but 
it is the only one available for this sample. 
13. All the tests are available upon request to the authors. 
14 Look at  Allegret and Sand (2006). 
15 Leeper and Faust (1997) criticize the wide use of long run restrictions to study the sources of business cycles 
because of the weak reliability of structural inference for finite samples. In particular, “unless strong restrictions 
are applied, conventional inferences regarding impulse responses will be badly biased in all sample sizes”. 
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country specific spreads16. As explained, the ordering can be different for domestic variables. The 
contemporary correlation matrix of the reduced form residuals for Argentina points out the strong 
correlation of Argentinean interest rates with other domestic variables: we interpret this outcome as 
the consequence of the Currency Board regime with a passive monetary policy (and an exogenous 
interest rate with respect to prices and output); obviously, prices had no influence on a strictly pegged 
exchange rate. So, we consider here the output (or more exactly its proxy, the A_IPI) as the main 
adjustment variable in such way that in our model, it is the most endogenous. 
In Brazil and Uruguay, we consider prices as the most exogenous domestic variable: these countries 
have a long tradition of price indexation (the succession of stabilization packages managed to  break 
pessimistic forward expectations of the accelerating inflation times; but it could not eliminate 
completely backward rigidities)17. So, the policies of both these economies continue to be mainly 
driven by price stability targeting, even if the intermediary exchange rate regime allows a soft peg. As 
for Argentina, the output can be consider as an adjustment variable, i.e. the most endogenous in  both 
country models. 
The model 
We estimated a VARs model in log difference of the variables (except interest rates and the EMBI) for 
each country. The number of lags in each model has been selected using the common set of criteria 
and tests (available on the software Eviews 5 and RATS 6). However, it is well known that 
conventional VAR estimation frequently leads to an over-parametrization (because of the number of 
explanatory variables and lags). Moreover, the VARs are subject to strong colinearity amongst the 
lagged right side variables: so, the significance of parameters and more generally the robustness of 
tests are relatively limited. In short, over parametrized models have poor forecasting accuracy18.  So, 
in the presence of contradictory results (given by the usual criteria), we followed the parsimony 
principle and accepted one lag for every country case.  
For each country “K”, the standard (reduced) form of our VAR with constant is the following :  
                                                 
16 Fernández-Arias and Panizza (2001) ; González-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005). 
17 On these points, look at Sand-Zantman and Trotignon, 2002, for the Brazil, and Clavijo, Regules,  and 
Bogliaccini, 2005, for Uruguay. 
18 We excluded a Bayesian approach (BVAR), a way to deal with a great number of parameters (here those of 
lagged variables), thanks to prior information: in our case, such a bet could have been more arbitrary and 
hazardous (Amisiano and Giannini (1997)). 
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3) for Uruguay: 
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In order to account for specific country shocks during the period, and for the evidence of a 
deterministic trend affecting the set of variables- before the Real Plan for Brazil and in the whole 
period for Uruguay, we added the following dummies: 
- DUMA for the first semester of 2002 in Argentina, to account for the Currency Board collapse;   
- DUMB from 1990Q1 to 1994Q2 in Brazil, to account for the period of accelerating inflation, 
up to the Stabilization Real Plan,  
- DUMU for the whole year 2002 in Uruguay: after three years of economical and political 
mayhem from 1999 to 2002, the combination of political uncertainty - with the expectations of 
the left-wing party success in the national elections - and external shocks - due to Argentinean 
and Brazilian instability – has heavily affected the Uruguayan variables. 
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One has to keep in mind that our three economies have adopted different exchange rate regimes. 
Furthermore, these have later evolved, following independent paths for the period. In short: 
- from 1991 to 2001, Argentina was ruled by a currency board (hard peg) and then by an 
independent regime of floating; 
- from 1991 to 1997, Brazil has adopted a crawling band regime (a kind of real exchange rate 
targeting) more or less “de jure” and more or less narrow, according to the context: in the 
following lines, we identify this regime as an intermediate exchange rate regime. After the 
strong currency crisis, in January 1999, Brazil implemented a flexible exchange rate regime 
combined with inflation targeting.  
- From 1991 to 2001, Uruguay adopted an intermediate exchange rate regime based on crawling 
bands. In June 2002, the authorities decided to implement a floating regime. 
 
Using this framework, we propose now to combine the impulse response functions (tracing out the 
time paths of the effects of “pure” shocks on the set of variables) and the forecast error variance 
decomposition (indicating the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its “own” shocks 
versus to the other variables). These experiments aim at identifying what kind of shocks, real or 
nominal, drive economic fluctuations in the three countries. It allows us to make an assessment of the 
similarities in the reactions of macroeconomic variables to these shocks. By the way, we will get a 
first outline of the specific - versus common - economic consequences of shocks in terms of 
“spontaneous” adjustments and moreover in term of policy responses.   
The results are presented in Appendix 2 and 3. When there is high correlation between some pairs of 
the reduced form residuals, the results can depend on the variable ordering in the Choleski 
factorization. So, we have tested the sensitivity of our results to alternative orders but we did not note 
significant changes in the conclusions for the more plausible permutations. 
Results 
Results analyzed hereafter refer to the most significant responses of domestic variables to shocks 
included in our VAR system. 
Responses of domestic variables to an external real shock: the I_IPI shock 
In the three countries, domestic industrial production increases after a shock on IPI of industrial 
countries. Conjuncture in industrial countries exerts an influence on business cycles in Mercosur 
countries. Variance decompositions (see Appendix 3) show that this influence is especially strong for 
Argentina: after 6 periods, I_IPI innovations explain between 13 and 16% of the A_IPI variance. 
Brazil –as a relatively closed economy- and Uruguay –where the dependence on US conjuncture is 
more pronounced- do not exhibit such influence of the I_IPI. The responses of domestic interests rates 
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differ according to the exchange rate regime. Thus, in Brazil, the shock on I_IPI induces a strong 
increase in interest rates during the first two quarters, followed by a smooth adjustment towards the 
initial equilibrium. On the other hand, Argentinean interest rates decreases after the shock. We 
interpret this asymmetric response of interest rates in the two main Mercosur countries as a 
consequence of the exchange rate regimes on inflation expectations. More precisely, the Argentinean 
currency board gives the economy a stronger nominal anchor. As a result, inflationary pressures in 
Argentina are less present than in Brazil. 
In these two countries, I_IPI innovations explain more than 10% of the domestic interest rates 
variance. For Argentina, the influence is especially important with a persistence effect: the share 
explained by I_IPI increases with the number of periods. 
Responses of domestic variables to international financial shock 
Responses to shocks and variance decompositions allow us to draw some general lessons suggesting  
that Argentina is especially sensible to the EMBI shock. 
Two factors explain the specific vulnerability of Argentina to the pure international financial shock. 
On one hand, over the studied period, Argentina has been one of the main borrower in international 
capital markets. Until the end of the 1990s’, Argentina benefited from very favorable conditions to 
borrow. So, capital inflows increased during this period. After 1999, its spread dramatically increased. 
Argentina suffered from a sudden-stop of capital inflows (Calvo, Izquiro, and Talvi (2003)) whose 
main consequence was a drop in domestic output. As a result, in comparison to the two other 
countries, the Argentinean economy appears especially sensible to EMBI fluctuations. On the other 
hand, the monetary policy constraints due to the currency board limit the ability of authorities to react 
in face of EMBI shocks, inducing strong and ample macroeconomic variability. From this point of 
view, the exchange rate regime exacerbated the sudden-stop problem. While in countries with floating 
exchange rates the domestic currency tends to depreciate after an increase in the EMBI, in hard peg 
countries such as Argentina, the impact of the shock is more pronounced on consumption prices and 
industrial production: prices and production decrease after the EMBI shock. 
In the two countries with intermediate regimes, responses of domestic variables and their variance 
decompositions suggest that prices, production and interest rates are not significantly affected by the 
international financial shock. Brazilian and Uruguayan exchange rates are influenced by this shock. In 
the two countries, the domestic money depreciates after the shock. The exchange rate absorbs in part 
the negative impact of the international financial shock. This explains the weak responses of other 
domestic variables to this shock. We observe the opposite for Argentina. Thus our results exhibit a 
clear distinction between countries with soft pegs and countries with hard pegs. 
Responses of domestic variables to real domestic shock 
In the three countries, domestic IPI shocks do not lead to significant responses of other variables. 
Variance decompositions bring out the fact that no other domestic variable has its variance in part 
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explained by IPI innovations. Over the studied period, the industrial production is an adjustment 
variable. This similarity across our three countries is explained by monetary policy constraints faced 
by domestic authorities either in the case of a hard peg (Argentina) or in the case of an economic 
policy based on the fight against inflation (Brazil and Uruguay). 
Responses of domestic variables to nominal domestic shocks 
We consider a shock on CPI (Consumption Price Index) as a nominal demand one. This shock allows 
us to discriminate between hard peg and soft peg countries. In addition, it appears that Brazil and 
Uruguay –the two economies with soft pegs- react differently to this shock. 
Argentina exhibits a rapid adjustment without major fluctuations of other domestic variables. Variance 
decompositions of domestic variables show that A_CPI innovations explain only its own variance, 
whatever the considered period. This lack of reaction is a consequence of the effect of the currency 
board on the inflation anchor. 
In countries with soft pegs, inflation expectations are imperfectly anchored. So, in Brazil and Uruguay, 
shocks on prices induce higher fluctuations than in Argentina. In Brazil, the shock is short lived, less 
than two quarters, while it is strong and persistent in Uruguay suggesting the existence of nominal 
rigidities in the later. In both countries, the shock is followed by a recession (a decline in IPI): higher 
prices go with pessimistic expectations. Interest rate responses are strong in the short term, and the 
adjustment is slow especially in Uruguay. This path is explained by a weaker credibility of monetary 
policy. Monetary authorities are constrained to react quickly in order to prevent the development of 
indexation mechanisms. On nominal exchange rates, we have a significant depreciation over different 
horizons: a very short term response in Brazil (less than one quarter) and a longer impact for Uruguay 
(more than four quarters). In both countries price innovations explain a significant share of the 
exchange rate variance. These links between prices and exchange rates could mean that these two 
countries had a real exchange rate target in the 1990s’. As a small open economy, this target has been 
especially important in Uruguay. 
Responses of domestic variables to domestic monetary policy shocks 
The innovations on nominal interest rate are monetary policy shocks. The adjustments after an interest 
rates shock differ according to the exchange rate regime: very fast in Argentina (less than one quarter); 
four quarters (Brazil) or more (Uruguay) for intermediate exchange rate regime countries. Thus the 
resilience of the monetary policy shock seems higher in this second group of countries. Two opposing 
interpretations of this different path are conceivable: first, an insufficient credibility of monetary 
policy in economies with soft pegs; second, a more reactive monetary policy as a result of the less 
binding exchange rate regime. The analysis of the responses of other domestic variables leads us to 
consider that the first explanation is the most relevant: even in countries with intermediate regimes, 
monetary policy reacts little to non-inflationary shocks revealing a “fear of floating” behavior (Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002)).  
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The responses of consumption prices contrast in the three countries. No price puzzle appears in 
Argentina and Uruguay: prices decrease after the interest rate shock. On the other hand, not only 
Brazilian prices increase as a result of the shock, but the return towards equilibrium appears after five 
quarters. Prices movements can be interpreted as a Cavallo-Patman effect where higher interest rates 
increase production costs via the financing needs of working capital, leading to inflationary pressures 
(Taylor (1981)). The variance of B_CPI is strongly explained by interest rate innovations: 31% in 
period 2; 38-39% after period 6. The increase in the interest rate in Brazil can be interpreted as the 
result of a credibility loss in a context of fear of inflation. From this point of view, the interest rate is 
overall an indicator of inflationary pressures neither than a response to them (Favero and Giavazzi 
(2002)). 
Nominal exchange rates exhibit weak responses in Argentina and Uruguay. On the contrary, the 
reaction is strong and long-lasting (approximately four quarters) for Brazil. The nominal exchange rate 
follows a traditional overreaction mechanism: appreciation at the impact, then strong depreciation. We 
interpret the evolution as an insufficient credibility of the monetary authorities. According to variance 
decompositions of nominal exchange rates, innovations on interest rate do not explain a significant 
part of their variance, except in Brazil. 
Responses of domestic variables to nominal exchange rate shocks 
The response of production in Brazil is weak. This result is consistent with the main characteristics of 
the Brazilian economy: low openness and dollarization degrees. In addition, exchange rate innovations 
do not explain the variance of other domestic variables. In Argentina and Uruguay, IPI decreases after 
the shock, but with a lagged effect in the latter country. Indeed, dollarization in these two economies 
implies that domestic currency depreciation produces a negative balance sheet effect. The dollarization 
of external debt in Argentina explains the stronger response of IPI19. Exchange rate innovations 
explain 13% of the A_IPI variance contemporaneously and 10-11% after six periods. 
Responses of prices suggest that pass-through effects are either absent (Argentina and Uruguay) or 
short-lived (Brazil). These results reinforce other studies which stressed the decrease of the exchange 
rate-domestic prices transmission in LAC since the 1990s’ (Larrain and Velasco (2001)). 
Interest rate responses are weak and insignificant (see variance decompositions) in Brazil and 
Uruguay. As expected under currency board arrangement, Argentinean interest rates react strongly at 
the impact of the shock. They increase in the two first quarters. 
 
The main implication of our results from our semi-structural VAR is the following: 
                                                 
19. Using the classification proposed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Argentina and Brazil belong to 
Type I dollarization –in which domestic and external liability dollarization co-exist- while Uruguay is a 
dollarized economy of Type II where dollarization is predominantly of a domestic nature. The degree of 
dollarization is different between these countries: high in Argentina (index 20 on a scale that goes from 0 to 30) 
and Uruguay (21), but moderate in Brazil (7). 
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Countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes seem more sensitive to nominal shocks while our 
hard peg country (Argentina) strongly responds to external financial shock (EMBI shock). In other 
words, the diversity of the exchange rate regimes among Mercosur countries explain the fact that these 
countries are vulnerable to different shocks and that the domestic dynamics are different after the 
shocks. Second, our three countries have a similar characteristic: industrial production exerts a weak 
influence on other variables. 
From this point of view, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay do not constitute an optimal currency area. 
Our space-state model will confirm this outcome. 
3. Identification of common and country specific components of structural 
shocks using a state-space model 
The main purpose of structural VAR estimation is to get non-recursive orthogonalization of the error 
terms for impulse response analysis and variance decompositions of forecast errors. Whatever the 
identification restrictions (short or long run), and their theoretical (or “a-theoretical”) foundations 
(choice of an “ad-hoc” scheme of identification, or  decomposition “ à la Blanchard et Quah” 
contrasting  demand and supply shocks on the basis of long run neutrality on the supply side), these 
experiments don’t allow the distinction between common and specific components of fluctuations and 
shocks. However, this distinction, and overall the weight of common component, are the fundamental 
criteria of judgment in the choice of economic and monetary integration. Following the OCA theory, a 
too light weight of common component implies significant adjustment of exchange rates in the case of 
strong shocks. Such adjustments are difficult to endure in a simple free trade area. Moreover, it 
becomes impossible in the case of a common monetary zone. In short, any integration process implies 
symmetry, i.e. a large common component. 
In order to assess the share of the common and idiosyncratic components in the variability of the 
structural shocks (policy shocks included), we propose a breakdown in two unobservable stochastic 
components using the Kalman filter (Harvey (1989), Kim and Nelson (1999)). The same method has 
been used by Bosco N’Goma (2000) for members of CFA Zone, by Chamie, Desserres, and Lalonde 
(1994) for a comparison between Europe and the USA, or by Lalonde and St-Amand (1993) for 
ALENA. We report here a sum up of the explanations proposed by this set of papers.  
Methodology 
The state-space models distinguish observed variables (the “signal” or “observation”) and unobserved 
variables (“state” variables). They are composed of two sets of equations: 
One or several “signal “ (or “measurement”) equations relating the observable variables to the 
unobservable states ;  
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One or several “state” (or “transition”) equations describing  how the vector of “states” evolves over 
time. 
In this part, we aim at breaking down shocks affecting jointly the three members of Mercosur - or any 
pair of them – into two unobservable components: a common component for the three countries – or at 
least for two of them- and  an idiosyncratic component, specific for each country. We note : 
the three members by i= A, B and U respectively for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay ; 
_ ,i j tε  the real or nominal shocks, for the period « t », with j=IPI, CPI, En, R ; 
{ }_ ,C j tn  the common components ; 
{ }_ ,i j tn  the idiosyncratic components ; 
_i jα  and (  the respective weight of common and idiosyncratic components in each 
shock 
)_1 i jα−
_ ,i j tε  ; 
The decomposition consists of the estimation of  the parameters _i jα  and the time series { }_ ,C j tn  
and { }_ ,i j tn . 
In our state-space model, the following equations: 
( )
( )
( )
_ ,
_ __ ,
_ ,
_ , _ _
_ ,
_ , _ _ _ ,
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
C IPI t
A j A jA j t
A IPI t
B j t B j B j
B IPI t
U j t U j U j U IPI t
n
n
n
n
α αε
ε α α
ε α α
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
constitute the  measurement (or transition) system, with the structural innovations – stemming  from 
the decomposition of  our reduced form VAR residuals – as endogenous variables. 
To estimate the parameters _i jα  and the series _ ,C j tn  and _ ,i j tn , we need a set of transition 
equations, specifying the dynamics of the unobservable components. For identification purposes, we  
assume that common and specific components are uncorrelated. In a large number of software 
packages – and in particular Eviews 5 and Rats 6, used here – the identifying restrictions assume 
normalized structural innovations _ ,i j tε  , with unit variance. This normalization facilitates the 
comparison of structural shocks, stemming from our different country VARs estimated separately! We 
will also assume unit variance for the unobservable components. While determining the stochastic 
components path through the definition of  their distributions, this assumption defines the transition 
equations. So, we can write as  “state” system: 
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Finally, we must choose a reference country shock to which the other shocks will be compared: we 
will choose Argentina when Argentina is present (and Brazil in the other cases) and start estimation 
initializing _ 1i jα = . The Kalman filter algorithm will be used to decompose the structural shock 
and idiosyncratic and (if they exist) common components.  
Results 
The main result is that we can never observe any significant common component for the three 
countries20! But for some variables, the estimation showed the presence of common components for 
pairs of Mercosur countries.  
So, in the case of CPI, the inflation path has a weak but significant common component of 9% for 
Argentina and Brazil 
 
Table 1 Decomposition of inflation innovations for Argentina and Brazil 
 
CPI_MB_AB Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C(1) 0.992180 0.068671 14.44830 0.0000 
C(2) 0.088781 0.036808 2.412014 0.0159 
 
We can find a common component nearly equivalent in the case of the nominal exchange rate for 
Argentina and Brazil. Considering the differences in both the exchange rate regimes during the better 
part of the period, it could seem paradoxical. But it accounts for the common volatility of the years 
2001-2002 triggered by the Argentinean crisis and worsened by the political uncertainty in Brazil.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The foreign variables, the IPI for industrialized countries and either the EMBI, are endogenous in each one of 
our country models: so we can deduce orthogonal shocks for both these variables. Obviously, looking for a 
common component in these case doesn’t present any theoretical interest.  But allowed us to check the efficiency 
of the Kalman Filter: we found indeed the predicted result of a strong significant common component in every 
case.  
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Table 2 Decomposition of innovations for nominal exchange rates in the case of Argentina 
and Brazil 
 
En_MB_AB Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C(1) 0.992144 0.042701 23.23442 0.0000 
C(2) 0.088986 0.037234 2.389951 0.0169 
 
At last, we find also a weak - but significant – common component of 15% for both the main 
economies of Mercosur. 
 
Table 3 Decomposition of innovations for domestic industrial growth rate in the case of 
Argentina and Brazil 
 
IPI_MB_AB Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C(1) 0.979247 0.049178 19.91226 0.0000 
C(2) 0.145616 0.072461 2.009569 0.0445 
 
Curiously, Uruguay doesn’t exhibit these features: but the extent of idiosyncratic domestic volatility 
during the period displayed by the primary data (see Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2006)) probably 
conceals a large part of  the foreign perturbations spillover.  
However, the outcomes are slightly different for nominal interest rates: as shown in the following 
table, Brazil and Uruguay exhibit a small common component (about 8.5%). 
 
Table 4 Decomposition of innovations for domestic interest rate in the case of  Brazil and 
Uruguay 
 
R_MB_BU Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C(2) 0.993101 0.050234 19.76943 0.0000 
C(3) 0.083350 0.041380 2.014267 0.0440 
 
In brief, it is difficult to exhibit an unambiguous and significant macroeconomic convergence of the 
three Mercosur partners, either in terms of weight or in terms of statistical significance. In particular, 
the exceptional macroeconomic volatility of Uruguay during the period conceals any foreign 
influence. Argentina and Brazil, which have known a significant trend of trade integration before the 
Brazilian crisis of 1998-1999, and shared common waves of speculative attacks after the collapse of 
the Argentinean currency board  seem to exhibit symptoms of common shocks.  
But finally, in spite of the evidence of common shocks linked to world conjuncture or to speculative 
behavior on the international financial market, the policy mix of the Mercosur members remains 
strongly specific. 
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4. Conclusion 
Our results converge to indicate that the Mercosur countries are not predisposed to form a monetary 
union either between them, or with the United States. First, the SSVAR proves the weak coordination 
of economic policies between these countries. In particular, identical nominal shocks involve different 
adjustment paths. This low level of synchronization and policy coordination is confirmed by the 
“state-space” models: the latter displayed the weak common component of the various shocks 
involved in the experiments.  Second, including a typical common international financial shock - here 
the EMBI - suggests one more time idiosyncratic responses: obviously, the variety of exchange rate 
regimes and policies in the area during this period did not ease convergence and coordination! 
In short, our results stay in line with the whole literature on the Latin American integration process. 
Furthermore, it confirms the theoretical analyses relative to the place of exchange rate regimes   
adjustments in the face of macroeconomic shocks.  
It must be stressed that these results stem from SSVAR studies including more variables than the 
majority of papers published on the subject. However, these analyses must be deepened in some 
privileged directions. First, accounting for the EMBI allowed us to provide a better assessment of the 
world financial shocks impact on the feasibility of monetary unions; but domestic consequences of 
structural breaks – linked to these shocks - continue to be imperfectly grasped: in particular, we did 
not embody explicitly implications of  the “sudden stop” hitting Latin American economies during 
these times. A hint would be to include some of the more relevant variables allowing to account for 
these facts: trade balance, current accounts, or international reserves could be used to test the impact of 
“sudden stop” of capital inflows on trade balance and output. Second, our set of variables did not 
exhibit any cointegrating vector: it is probably due to the presence of structural breaks. A next step 
will be to deal with this issue in order to build a VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) able to 
embody short and long run dynamics, allowing us to focus on respective speeds of adjustment: indeed, 
very different speeds of adjustment could prejudice any project of monetary integration (except 
obviously for the endogenous OCA perspective). 
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Appendix 1 Residuals correlation matrix of reduced forms of SSVAR estimations. 
 
Argentina : 
 
 DLI_IPI EMBI DLA_IPI DLA_CPI A_R DLA_EN 
DLI_IPI  1.000000      
EMBI -0.011770  1.000000     
DLA_IPI  0.162367 -0.214967  1.000000    
DLA_CPI  0.073598 -0.070295  0.275767  1.000000   
A_R -0.258758  0.263431 -0.334864 -0.292683  1.000000   
DLA_EN  0.139414  0.102633 -0.357663 -0.253702  0.061690  1.000000 
 
Brazil 
 
 DLI_IPI EMBI DLB_IPI DLB_CPI B_R DLB_EN 
DLI_IPI  1.000000      
EMBI -0.124227  1.000000     
DLB_IPI  0.211992 -0.117485  1.000000    
DLB_CPI  0.008888  0.065573 -0.593936  1.000000   
B_R  0.175577  0.125298 -0.069194  0.083392  1.000000  
DLB_EN  0.014061  0.361806 -0.261877  0.424131 -0.051073  1.000000 
 
Uruguay 
 
 DLI_IPI EMBI DLU_IPI DLU_CPI U_R DLU_EN 
DLI_IPI  1.000000      
EMBI -0.152621  1.000000     
DLU_IPI  0.078686 -0.068776  1.000000    
DLU_CPI -0.127314  0.079218 -0.134949  1.000000   
U_R  0.068115  0.095316 -0.075089  0.551850  1.000000  
DLU_EN -0.139600  0.110233 -0.049260  0.750403  0.560811  1.000000 
 
Appendix 2 Responses to Cholesky One SD (Innovations ±2 SE) 
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Brazil 
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Uruguay 
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Appendix 3 Variance Decompositions, in % 
  Argentina                 Brazil    
 A_EN Variance decomposition   B_CPI Variance decomposition 
  IPI EMBI A_EN A_R A_CPI A_IPI    I_IPI EMBI B_CPI B_R B_EN B_IPI 
1 2 1 97 0 0 0  1 0 0 100 0 0 0 
6 2 2 91 4 0 1  6 6 4 49 39 1 1 
12 2 2 91 4 0 1  12 6 4 49 39 1 1 
               
A_R Variance decomposition  B_R Variance decomposition 
  IPI EMBI A_EN A_R A_CPI A_IPI    I_IPI EMBI B_CPI B_R B_EN B_IPI 
1 7 7 1 86 0 0  1 3 2 1 94 0 0 
6 29 7 7 57 0 1  6 12 2 2 81 2 1 
12 31 8 7 54 0 1  12 12 2 2 81 2 1 
               
 A_CPI Variance  decomposition   B_EN Variance decomposition 
  IPI EMBI A_EN A_R A_CPI A_IPI    I_IPI EMBI B_CPI B_R B_EN B_IPI 
1 1 0 7 7 86 0  1 0 13 16 2 69 0 
6 1 20 7 6 65 1  6 2 16 12 22 48 0 
12 4 27 6 5 58 1  12 2 17 12 22 48 0 
               
 A_IPI Variance  decomposition  B_IPI Variance decomposition 
  IPI EMBI A_EN A_R A_CPI A_IPI    I_IPI EMBI B_CPI B_R B_EN B_IPI 
1 3 5 13 5 1 73  1 4 1 35 0 0 59 
6 13 11 11 5 3 57  6 6 2 34 3 0 55 
12 16 14 10 5 3 53  12 6 2 34 3 0 55 
               
      Uruguay            
U_CPI Variance  decomposition         
  I_IPI EMBI U_CPI U_R U_EN U_IPI         
1 2 0 98 0 0 0         
6 3 0 73 11 12 1         
12 7 0 62 16 15 0         
               
U_R Variance  decomposition         
  I_IPI EMBI U_CPI U_R U_EN U_IPI         
1 0 1 31 67 0 0         
6 6 1 23 67 1 2         
12 8 1 22 65 2 2         
               
U_EN Variance  decomposition         
  I_IPI EMBI U_CPI U_R U_EN U_IPI         
1 2 1 54 3 40 0         
6 2 1 52 3 38 4         
12 2 1 52 3 38 4         
               
  U_IPI Variance decomposition         
  I_IPI EMBI U_CPI U_R U_EN U_IPI         
1 1 0 2 0 1 97         
6 2 0 3 1 1 92         
12 3 0 3 2 2 91         
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